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INTRODUCTION
Not far from the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, DC(the “District”) runs a railroad track that is part of CSXCorporation’s (a major North American railroad compa-
ny) North-South railroad corridor along the Eastern coast of the
United States.1 While a railroad track is not normally a cause for
concern, rail cars on this particular track carry large volumes of
some of the world’s most dangerous chemicals.2 For instance,
90-ton rail tankers filled with hazardous chemicals such as chlo-
rine gas regularly pass over a small bridge that is unsecured, in a
low traffic area, and easily accessible to anyone.3 A recent study
by the Naval Research Laboratory estimated that a terrorist
explosion set in such a strategic location, during a political rally
or celebration on the National Mall, could result in the release of
toxic gases with the potential to seriously injure or kill over one
hundred thousand people within half an hour.4
The possibility of such a catastrophic event should be of
major concern not only to the chemical transportation industry,
but also to the federal and District government. While the fed-
eral government has done little to address this risk, the City
Council of Washington, DC (“DC Council”) has taken measures
to regulate the transportation of hazardous materials (hereinafter
“hazmats”) around the Capitol.5 The Bush Administration and
CSX are currently fighting this regulation in the CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. Anthony A. Williams case. This article
will argue that the DC Council’s regulation of hazmats in the
District should be upheld, and will also explore other potential
means to secure transportation of dangerous chemicals in and
around the nation’s Capitol.
REGULATION OF HAZMATS AROUND
THE U.S. CAPITOL
THE TERRORISM PREVENTION IN HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY ACT OF 2005
The controversy over hazmat regulation around the U.S.
Capitol began on February 1, 2005 when the DC Council
approved the Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials
Transportation Emergency Act of 2005 (hereinafter “the DC
Act”).6 The DC Act creates an area deemed the “Capitol
Exclusion Zone,” defined as: “all points within 2.2 miles of the
United States Capitol building; provided, that the Capitol
Exclusion Zone shall not extend beyond the geographic bound-
aries of the District of Columbia.”7 The Act prohibits the ship-
ment of hazmats through the zone without a permit from the
District’s Department of Transportation (“DDOT”).8 The CSX
Corporation controls the only two rail corridors that carry haz-
mats through the District, the North-South corridor and the East-
West line, which originates in Washington, DC. This regulation
effectively banned CSX from transporting hazmats through the
District by either of these two tracks. Wishing to prevent
increased costs of transportation, CSX brought suit against the
District to enjoin the DC Act from going into effect.9 This suit
spawned continuing litigation that centers not only on the regula-
tion of chemical transportation, but also on national security and
federalism, including the precarious role the District has as both
the federally controlled capital and a local state-like government.
Although the DC Court of Appeals ultimately placed a stay on the
DC Act,10 CSX has agreed to temporarily halt transportation of
hazmats through the District during the pending litigation.11
THE CSX V. WILLIAMS LITIGATION
Procedural History
In CSX v. Williams, CSX sought to enjoin the enforcement
of the DC Act, alleging that the act: (1) violated the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) was preempted by federal
law; and (3) went beyond the authority granted to the DC local
government in the Home Rule Act.12 In a well-reasoned opin-
ion, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan denied both CSX’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction.13 Additionally, the United States was denied its
Motion to Enforce a decision made by the Surface
Transportation Board (“STB”) against Washington, DC.14
Even though the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the District Court’s denial of a Preliminary
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Injunction, ruling in favor of CSX,15 this article asserts that
Judge Sullivan used the correct analysis. A preliminary injunc-
tion requires the court to consider four factors: likelihood of
success of the moving party, irreparable harm to the moving
party, a balancing of the harms/risks, and the public interest.16
With respect to the likelihood of success, the District Court
reviewed all of CSX’s claims against the act and found it unlike-
ly that CSX would prevail on the merits.17 However, the Court
of Appeals disagreed, finding that CSX was likely to prevail on
the claim of federal preemption.18 Because it is not contested
that CSX will be unlikely to prevail on its claim of a violation
of the “dormant” commerce clause, and because the United
States will be unlikely to prevail on its Motion to Enforce the
STB’s opinion, this article will only discuss the issues sur-
rounding the claim of federal preemption. 
Issues of Federal Preemption
CSX and the United States claimed that the Federal
Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act (“HMTA”), and the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) preempted the DC
Act.19 The FRSA provides that “states may regulate in the area
of railroad safety and security
‘until’ the federal government
‘prescribes a regulation or
issues an order covering the
subject matter of the State
requirement,’” and that for local
hazards, states may impose
more strict regulations “as long
as they are not ‘incompatible’
with federal regulation, and do
not ‘unreasonably burden inter-
state commerce.’”20 The
District Court interpreted this to
mean that the DC Act would
survive a preemption challenge against the FRSA if the act was
filling a gap in federal law or if it was addressing a mainly local
hazard without interfering with federal law.21 CSX and the
United States argued that the DC Act facially violated the FRSA
because Final Rule HM-232, issued by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (“U.S. DOT”), addressed the same subject mat-
ter.22 However, HM-232 merely requires private industry “to
develop and implement voluntary security plans” [emphasis
added].23 As such, the District Court found that the rule did not
conflict with federal law; rather, it helped further it.24
The HMTA similarly allows states to regulate the trans-
portation of hazmats unless the non-federal regulation creates an
obstacle to complying with federal law or if it is not possible to
comply with both regulations.25 Again, CSX and the United
States argued that HM-232 preempted the DC Act under this
standard.26 According to the federal government, the purpose
behind such lax regulation is to allow for flexibility in how
industry provides for security.27 CSX and the United States
claimed that the DC Act hindered this flexibility.28 While the
District Court did not question the government’s policy decision
regarding the flexibility of security plans, it determined that the
DC Act neither presented an obstacle to the federal policy, nor
was it impossible for CSX to comply with both the DC Act and
the federal policy.29
The ICCTA, unlike the FRSA and HMTA, does not express-
ly allow for state regulation; CSX and the United States thus
argued that the ICCTA preempted any state attempt to regulate
the railroads.30 The District Court disagreed with this position,
stating that such a position “interprets the ICCTA in a ‘contextu-
al vacuum’, completely ignoring the existence of the surrounding
statutory framework, including the FRSA.”31 The District Court
went on to hold that the DC Act did not deal with interstate com-
merce or the infrastructure of the railroad – both of which would
fall under the jurisdiction of the ICCTA – the DC Act only dealt
with safety and security, and thus fell within the historical coop-
eration of state and federal regulation of the railroads.32
The District Court concluded that the DC Act would likely
not be preempted by any of the federal laws presented by CSX
and the United States.33 The Court of Appeals, however, did not
agree and ordered the reversal of the District Court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction.34 The Court of Appeals found that CSX
was likely to succeed in its argument that the FRSA would pre-
empt the DC Act.35 Accordingly, the court found a preliminary
injunction to be appropriate.36
The difference in opinions
between the District Court and
the Court of Appeals is based on
conflicting interpretations of
whether the current federal reg-
ulation HM-232, substantially
covered the subject matter of
the DC Act, and whether the DC
Act was an obstacle to the
implementation of the federal
regulation or “unreasonably
burden[ed] interstate com-
merce.”37 The Court of Appeals decided the District Court was
incorrect in determining what HM-232 covered, and that the DC
Act created both an obstacle to complying with HM-232 and
“unreasonably burden[ed] interstate commerce.”38 For example,
the Court of Appeals reasoned that because U.S. DOT specifi-
cally rejected routing requirements during the development of
HM-232, the rule substantially subsumes the subject matter of
the DC Act.39 As such, HM-232 likely preempted the DC Act.40
Pursuant to §20106 of the FRSA, however, both HM-232
and the DC Act can stand so long as the DC Act does not inter-
fere with compliance of HM-232 and it does not “unreasonably
burden interstate commerce.”41 Again, the Court of Appeals
agreed with CSX and the United States, determining that the DC
Act frustrated HM-232 by not allowing rail carriers the flexibil-
ity the regulation intended.42 In addition, the court found that the
DC Act likely would “unreasonably burden interstate com-
merce,” because if allowed to stand, other local governments
would enact a patchwork of similar bans that would interfere
with the national hazmat transportation system.43
While CSX and the United States successfully moved the
Court of Appeals to preliminarily enjoin the DC Act from being
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enforced, it has yet to be determined whether the District Court
will issue a permanent injunction. Though the Court of Appeals
decided that CSX and the United States are likely to succeed on
the claim of federal preemption, this reasoning was flawed. The
DC Act deals with the unique potential for a chemical catastrophe
to occur in a highly populated urban center that is also in the seat
of the federal government. Although HM-232 gives private indus-
try the responsibility of securing the nation’s railroad system, it
does not “substantially” cover the unique local safety risks that
face Washington, DC. Rather, the rule merely touches the subject
matter of security and does not “substantially subsume” it, as
required by caselaw.44 Additionally, the DC Act only prohibits the
most hazardous of chemicals transported through the Capitol
Exclusion Zone and allows an exception for permit holders. This
does not create a significant obstacle in allowing industry flexi-
bility in implementing self-determined security measures. 
Critics might argue that the DC Act essentially bans hazmat
transportation through the entire state, which would be a viola-
tion of the dormant commerce clause.45 However, this is not
what the DC Act does. The DC Act places tight regulations on
the transportation of hazmats through a particularly high-risk
area of the DC Council’s jurisdiction.46 As previously discussed,
under the current federal statutory scheme regulating the trans-
portation of hazmats, states are allowed to impose more strin-
gent regulations than those of the federal agencies. As such, the
District Court should not permanently enjoin the DC Act.
ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO PROTECT
THE CAPITOL AREA
If the DC Act is permanently enjoined, there are other pos-
sible means to secure transportation of dangerous chemicals in
and around the Capitol. Currently, CSX and the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) are working to cre-
ate a “virtual boundary” around the District’s rail corridor.47
Such a boundary would involve two hundred surveillance cam-
eras around the rail corridor that would allow for 24-hour mon-
itoring.48 Also involved in the plan are several rapid response
teams that would act in conjunction with the surveillance to
increase security of the corridor.49
While this “virtual boundary” might increase security, it
will not eliminate the threat. To more adequately address the
issue, bills have been introduced in Congress, yet none have
been passed.50 One of the more comprehensive bills is Senator
Joseph Biden’s (D-DE) Hazardous Materials Vulnerability
Reduction Act of 2005 (hereinafter “HMVRA”) and its House
companion bill.51 The main purpose of HMVRA would be to
require DHS to promulgate regulations to properly secure high-
risk urban corridors involving the transportation of hazmats,
including dangerous chemicals, via rail.52 These regulations
would include criteria for determining high-risk corridors,
which would then require that any hazmats be rerouted around
the corridor with few exceptions.53 Additionally, the Secretary
of Homeland Security would annually report to Congress on the
frequency of and contents of hazmat transportation and owners
of hazmat transportation operations would have to notify local
government officials when transporting hazmats through their
jurisdiction.54 The other sections of the bill provide for
increased hazmat transportation security not specifically related
to urban areas. Section 4 of HMVRA would authorize the
Secretary of Homeland Security to award grants to both local
governments and private railroad companies for the purposes of
training and providing safety equipment to those who work
transporting hazmats. Section 5 of HMVRA would require the
Secretary to report to Congress after studying potential new
security technologies, and section 6 would provide for whistle-
blower protection.55 Such legislation would be a tremendous
step forward in securing the transportation of hazmats, includ-
ing dangerous chemicals. Currently, the bill is still in commit-
tee, but the Bush Administration does not support it.56
CONCLUSION
In an era where defense against terrorism is a national prior-
ity, the chemical industry has the burden of addressing immense
security concerns while still providing a national service. The
government of Washington, DC has a unique obligation to pro-
tect not only a densely populated urban core, but also the seat of
the federal government. The transportation of any dangerous
chemicals or other hazmats, poses a threat in any location, but
the transportation corridor through the District poses a unique
risk that must be addressed. While the Administration has facial-
ly addressed the issue, the DC Council properly took action to
protect the people within its jurisdiction. Because of industry
complaint, this action has all but been destroyed, and now faces
a permanent injunction. It is this article’s position, however, that
the Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials Transportation
Emergency Act of 2005 should not be permanently enjoined. In
conjunction with the DC Act, or in light of the Act being
enjoined, Congress should take action not only to protect itself,
but the city it calls home. Senator Biden’s bill, if passed, would
be a step in the right direction in limiting the transportation of
hazardous chemicals through Washington, DC. 
32SPRING 2006 
1 Washington’s Deadly Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2005, at A1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/opinion/05tue1.html?ex=12782
16000&en=7806df7623b3d0a2&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss
(last visted Mar. 19, 2006).
2 Deadly Bridge, id. 
3 Deadly Bridge, id..
4 Senator Joseph Biden, Introductory Statement, S.1256: The Hazardous
Materials Vulnerability Reduction Act of 2005, June 16, 2005, available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s109-1256 (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2006).
5 See Court Orders Feds to Produce Documents in Toxic Trains Case,
Press Release, DC Councilmember Kathy Paterson (Dec. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/patterson/pages/prin-
fo/Orderfor%20discovery%20in%20Toxins%20Case%2012.14.05.doc
(last visited Mar. 12, 2006); Cities Tackle Chemical Transportation
ENDNOTES: Toxic Trains
ENDNOTES: Toxic Trains Continued on page 81
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. 9601 §101 (1980) as amended by Public
Law 107-118 (H.R. 2869) - Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, signed into law January 11, 2002.
2 In re Grand Pier Center, LLC, PSD Appeal No. 04-01 (EAB, Oct. 28,
2005), 12 E.A.D. 29.
3 The State of America’s Brownfields: Hearing on What Can Be Done to
Spur Redevelopment at America’s Brownfield Sites? Before the
Subcommittee on Federalism and the Census, Committee on Government
Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (2005) (statement of John B.
Stephenson, GAO, Director, Natural Resources and Environment) [here-
inafter Hearing].
4 CERCLA, supra note 1, at SS. 9601-9675.
5 CERCLA, supra note 1, at §9607(a) .
6 Interfaith Community Organization vs. Honeywell International, Inc.,
2003 U.S Dist. LEXIS 8898, 191-195 (2003).
7 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir.
1990).
8 U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Stakeholders Report That EPA’s
Program Helps to Redevelop Sites, but Additional Measures Could
Complement Agency Efforts, 10 (GAO-05-94).
9 Stakeholders Report, id.
10 Hearing, supra note 4 (from the statement of Kevin L. Matthews,
Director of Governmental Relations for the American International
Group, Inc.)
11 In re Grand Pier Center, LLC, 12 E.A.D at 3-17.
12 In re Grand Pier Center, id.
13 In re Grand Pier Center, id.
14 In re Grand Pier Center, id.
81 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
Security, OMB Watch (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www.omb-
watch.org/article/articleview/2976/1/1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
6 The Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials Transportation
Emergency Act of 2005 [hereinafter DC Act], available at http://www
.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/patterson/pages/prinfo/HAZMAT.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2006).
7 DC Act, id. at § 3(1).
8 DC Act, id. at §§ 4-5.
9 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Anthony A. Williams, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6569 (D.D.C. 2005)
10 CSX v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
11 Michelle Bryner, First Stop: ‘Safety Culture’, CHEMICAL WEEK 29, Feb
8, 2006, available at http://www.chemweek.com/inc/articles/t/2006/
02/08/045.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
12 CSX , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569 at *2 .
13 CSX , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *97.
14 CSX , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *97. The STB is an administra-
tive board within the Dept. of Transportation that has jurisdiction over
rail carriers. 
15 CSX, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
16 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569 at *79-94.
17 CSX , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569 at *80-84.
18 CSX, 406 F.3d at 674 .
19 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *21-22.
20 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *22-23 (citing FRSA, 49 U.S.C.
§ 20106).
21 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *30.
22 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *33-34.
23 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *33-34.
24 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *39-40.
25 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *24.
26 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *39.
27 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *39.
28 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *39.
29 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *39-40.
30 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *41.
31 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *42.
32 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *44.
33 CSX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, at *80-83.
34 CSX, 406 F.3d at 674.
35 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 673.
36 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 674.
37 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 672-673.
38 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 672-673
39 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 671.
40 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 671-672.
41 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 671.
42 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 673.
43 CSX, 406 F.3d, at 673.
44 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 666, 123 L. Ed. 2d
387, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993); see also, CSX, 406 F.3d at 671.
45 CSX, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6569, 62-72 (D.D.C. 2005) (discussing the
dormant commerce clause). 
46 DC Act, supra note 6.
47 Amy Tsui, CSX Anticipates Starting Construction on D.C. ‘Virtual’
Rail Security Corridor, Jan. 30, 2006, available at http://www.dccoun-
cil.washington.dc.us/patterson/pages/prinfo/HazmatPress.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2006). 
48 Tsui, id.
49 Tsui, id.
50 See Hazardous Materials Vulnerability Reduction Act of 2005, S.1256,
109th Cong. (2005) (currently referred to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation); Hazardous Materials
Vulnerability Reduction Act of 2005, H.R.3510, 109th Cong. (2005) (cur-
rently referred to the House Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity); Extremely Hazardous
Materials Transportation Security Act of 2005, H.R.1414, 109th Cong.
(2005) (currently referred to the House Subcommittee on Management,
Integration and Oversight); Extremely Hazardous Materials Rail
Transportation Act of 2005, S.773, 109th Cong. (2005) (currently
referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation). But See To prevent the Terrorism Prevention in
Hazardous Materials Transportation Emergency Act of 2005 and the
Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials Transportation Temporary
Act of 2005, as passed by the Council of the District of Columbia, from
taking effect, H.R.2057, 109th Cong. (2005) (currently referred to House
Committee on Government Reform). 
51 Hazardous Materials Vulnerability Reduction Act of 2005, S.1256,
H.R.3510, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter HMVRA]; see generally,
Biden, supra note 4.
52 HMVRA, supra note 51, at § 3.
53 HMVRA, id.
54 HMVRA, id.
55 HMVRA, id, at §§ 5-6.
56 Deadly Bridge, supra note 1.
ENDNOTES: TOXIC TRAINS Continued from page 32
ENDNOTES: BROWNFIELD FINANCING Continued from page 41
